
Microeconomics
About us
The Microeconomics Research Cluster focuses on the behaviour of individuals and on institutions allocating scarce resources. Microeconomists at the Adam Smith Business School studies market failures arising from asymmetric information, default and miscoordination of expectations, as well as non traditional markets like electronic commerce, or markets without money, such as reputation systems on the internet and the assignment of students to schools. They examine the normative foundations of decision making under uncertainty and behavioural biases together with related empirical paradoxes. They apply this methodology to the empirical analysis of oligopolistic markets, of behavioural poverty traps, disease prevalence, crime, copyright, and more.
Leadership and members
Microtheory Seminar Series 2025-2026
The Microtheorists of the Adam Smith Business School are pleased to host a distinguished line‑up of speakers from leading institutions around the world, presenting their latest research and insights. Abstracts and speaker biographies for forthcoming sessions can be found on our Research Seminars webpage.
These seminars are open to all members of the School and the wider academic community. To obtain further details or to subscribe to seminar announcements, please contact the ASBS Seminar Series team.
Microtheory Seminar Series 2025-2026
Tuesday, 16 September 2025. 16:00
Professor Francesco Squintani, University of Warwick
(Full programme to follow)
Tuesday, 28 April 2026. 16:00
Professor Christian Ewerhart, University of Zurich
We are committed to providing a collegial, inclusive, and intellectually stimulating environment for all our seminars, in accordance with our established Code of Conduct.

Impact and engagement
Learn about our projects and activities
NHS fraud recovery
Professor Sayantan Ghosal and Dr Theodore Koutmeridis have worked with NHS Scotland to increase cash recoveries and save public money. Incorrectly claimed payment exemptions for dental and ophthalmic treatments previously cost NHS Scotland approximately £10 million per year. Using theoretical and empirical-based research, Professor Ghosal and Dr Koutmeridis collaborated with NHS Scotland on an initiative that increased cash recoveries by £580,000 during the pilot phase and ultimately changed the NHS’s practice and culture.
Related links
Disadvantage and participation accountability processes in India
Using theory and evidence from school development and management committees in Karnataka, India, Professor Sayantan Ghosal and Dr Theodore Koutmeridis have developed a conceptual framework to examine how poverty, marginalisation and exclusion impact on the beliefs and agency of parents, and to assess the impact of a pro-poor accountability framework. The project will lead to the development of training programmes tailored to encourage participation by disadvantaged groups in social accountability processes. Professor Michele Schweisfurth (Education), Dr Patricio Dalton (Tilburg School of Economics), and Dr Sanchari Roy (King’s College London) are co-investigators on this interdisciplinary ESRC-funded research project.
Publications
2025
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H. (2025) Fair congested assignment. Mathematics of Operations Research, (doi: 10.1287/moor.2024.0581)
Levy, Y. J. (2025) Independence of existence of measurable equilibrium selections. Israel Journal of Mathematics, (doi: 10.1007/s11856-025-2729-y)
2024
Hayashi, T. (2024) Belief aggregation, updating and dynamic collective choice. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 115, (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103050)
Chambers, C. P., Gerasimou, G. (2024) Non-diversified portfolios with subjective expected utility. Economics Letters, 244, (doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112036)
Gerasimou, G. (2024) Characterization of the Jaccard dissimilarity metric and a generalization. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 355, pp. 57-61. (doi: 10.1016/j.dam.2024.04.022)
Levy, Y. J. (2024) Bayesian equilibrium: from local to global. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 113, (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103012)
Levy, Y. J., Veiga, A. (2024) Optimal contract regulation in selection markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Bloise, G., Vailakis, Y. (2024) Sovereign debt crises and low interest rates. Journal of International Economics, 150, (doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103893)
Bogomolnaia, A. (2024) On slots' scheduling. Economic Theory, 77, pp. 653-674. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-023-01508-x)
Bloise, G., Le Van, C., Vailakis, Y. (2024) An approximation approach to dynamic programming with unbounded returns. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 111, (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102954)
Hayashi, T., Kiguchi, N., Takeoka, N. (2024) Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 26, (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12674)
Bloise, G., Le Van, C., Vailakis, Y. (2024) Do not blame Bellman: it is Koopmans' fault. Econometrica, 92, pp. 111-140. (doi: 10.3982/ECTA20386)
2023
Levy, Y. J. (2023) Slicing the Nash equilibrium manifold. Journal of Fixed Point Theory and Applications, 25, (doi: 10.1007/s11784-023-01088-2)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H. (2023) Guarantees in fair division: general or monotone preferences. Mathematics of Operations Research, 48, pp. 160-176. (doi: 10.1287/moor.2022.1255)
Bogomolnaia, A., Holzman, R., Moulin, H. (2023) On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators. Theoretical Economics, 18, pp. 97-127. (doi: 10.3982/TE4832)
2022
Hayashi, T., Takeoka, N. (2022) Habit formation, self-deception, and self-control. Economic Theory, 74, pp. 547-592. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-022-01445-1)
Costa-Gomes, M., Cueva, C., Gerasimou, G., Tejiščák, M. (2022) Choice, deferral, and consistency. Quantitative Economics, 13, pp. 1297-1318. (doi: 10.3982/qe1806)
Diasakos, T., Gerasimou, G. (2022) Preference conditions for invertible demand functions. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14, pp. 113-138. (doi: 10.1257/mic.20190262)
Bloise, G., Vailakis, Y. (2022) On sovereign default with time-varying interest rates. Review of Economic Dynamics, 44, pp. 211-224. (doi: 10.1016/j.red.2021.03.001)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2022) Dense orbits of the Bayesian updating group action. Mathematics of Operations Research, 47, pp. 384-396. (doi: 10.1287/moor.2021.1134)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2022) Equilibria existence in Bayesian games: climbing the countable Borel equivalence relation hierarchy. Mathematics of Operations Research, 47, pp. 367-383. (doi: 10.1287/moor.2021.1135)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F. (2022) On the fair division of a random object. Management Science, 68, pp. 1174-1194. (doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.3973)
Levy, Y. J. (2022) Uniformly supported approximate equilibria in families of games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 98, (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102571)
Hayashi, T. (2022) Envy-free solution under unequal labour skills. Communications in Economics and Mathematical Sciences, 1, pp. 23-37. (doi: 10.50906/cems.1.0_23)
2021
Bloise, G., Polemarchakis, H., Vailakis, Y. (2021) Sustainable debt. Theoretical Economics, 16, pp. 1513-1555. (doi: 10.3982/te4173)
Hanaki, N., Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M., Ogawa, K. (2021) Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: an experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 190, pp. 366-389. (doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.038)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2021) Social discount rate: spaces for agreement. Economic Theory Bulletin, 9, pp. 247-257. (doi: 10.1007/s40505-021-00209-9)
Hayashi, T. (2021) Collective decision under ignorance. Social Choice and Welfare, 57, pp. 347-359. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-021-01320-3)
Levy, Y. J. (2021) An update on continuous-time stochastic games of fixed duration. Dynamic Games and Applications, 11, pp. 418-432. (doi: 10.1007/s13235-020-00361-0)
Levy, Y. J., Veiga, A. (2021) Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost. Journal of Economic Theory, 192, (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105198)
Gerasimou, G. (2021) Simple preference intensity comparisons. Journal of Economic Theory, 192, (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105199)
2020
Levy, Y. J. (2020) On games without approximate equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 49, pp. 1125-1128. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-020-00734-0)
Levy, Y. J., Veiga, A. (2020) On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 124, pp. 140-168. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.016)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2020) Can everyone benefit from economic integration? Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22, pp. 821-833. (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12420)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2020) Can everyone benefit from innovation? Journal of Mathematical Economics, 88, pp. 187-191. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.001)
Hayashi, T. (2020) Investment in time preference and long-run distribution. Japanese Economic Review, 71, pp. 171-190. (doi: 10.1007/s42973-019-00021-y)
Hayashi, T. (2020) Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a labour production economy with unequal skills. Japanese Economic Review, 71, pp. 221-232. (doi: 10.1111/jere.12222)
Levy, Y. J., Solan, E. (2020) Stochastic games. Springer
2019
Gerasimou, G. (2019) Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences. Economic Theory Bulletin, 7, pp. 165-171. (doi: 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2)
Hayashi, T. (2019) What should society maximise under uncertainty? Japanese Economic Review, 70, pp. 446-478. (doi: 10.1111/jere.12230)
Hayashi, T. (2019) Self-fulfilling regression and statistical discrimination. International Journal of Economic Theory, 15, pp. 289-295. (doi: 10.1111/ijet.12190)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2019) Constrained implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 183, pp. 546-567. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.06.007)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2019) One-step-ahead implementation. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 83, pp. 110-126. (doi: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.04.007)
Aziz, H., Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H. (2019) Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous Preferences. (doi: 10.1145/3328526.3329552)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2019) Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements. Economic Theory, 67, pp. 775-816. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-017-1097-1)
Le Van, C., Navrouzoglou, P., Vailakis, Y. (2019) On endogenous formation of price expectations. Games and Economic Behavior, 115, pp. 436-458. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.004)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., Yanovskaia, E. (2019) Dividing bads under additive utilities. Social Choice and Welfare, 52, pp. 395-417. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2019) Measurable selection for purely atomic games. Econometrica, 87, pp. 593-629. (doi: 10.3982/ecta15479)
2018
Gerasimou, G., Tejiščák, M. (2018) Prest: open-source software for computational revealed preference analysis. Journal of Open Source Software, 3, (doi: 10.21105/joss.01015)
Gerasimou, G. (2018) Indecisiveness, undesirability and overload revealed through rational choice deferral. Economic Journal, 128, pp. 2161-2557. (doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12500)
Bogomolnaia, A. (2018) The most ordinally-egalitarian of random voting rules. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 20, pp. 271-276. (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12258)
Gerasimou, G. (2018) On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences. Economics Letters, 164, pp. 24-26. (doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.037)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2018) Reverse Bayesianism: a comment. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10, pp. 315-324. (doi: 10.1257/mic.20160187)
Bloise, G., Vailakis, Y. (2018) Convex dynamic programming with (bounded) recursive utility. Journal of Economic Theory, 173, pp. 118-141. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.008)
Gerasimou, G., Papi, M. (2018) Duopolistic competition with choice-overloaded consumers. European Economic Review, (doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.10.002)
2017
Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., Vailakis, Y. (2017) On the sovereign debt paradox. Economic Theory, 64, pp. 825-846. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-016-0971-6)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2017) Resource allocation with partial responsibilities for initial endowments. International Journal of Economic Theory, 13, pp. 355-368. (doi: 10.1111/ijet.12133)
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., Yanovskaya, E. (2017) Competitive division of a mixed manna. Econometrica, 85, pp. 1847-1871. (doi: 10.3982/ECTA14564)
Hellman, Z., Levy, Y. J. (2017) Bayesian games with a continuum of states. Theoretical Economics, 12, pp. 1089-1120. (doi: 10.3982/TE1544)
Bloise, G., Polemarchakis, H., Vailakis, Y. (2017) Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks. Theoretical Economics, 12, pp. 1121-1154. (doi: 10.3982/TE2146)
Chambers, C. P., Hayashi, T. (2017) Gains from trade. International Economic Review, 58, pp. 923-942. (doi: 10.1111/iere.12240)
Hayashi, T., Lombardi, M. (2017) Implementation in partial equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 169, pp. 13-34. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.01.008)
Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., Vailakis, Y. (2017) Borrowing in excess of natural ability to repay. Review of Economic Dynamics, 23, pp. 42-59. (doi: 10.1016/j.red.2016.09.006)
2016
Hayashi, T. (2016) Consistent updating of social welfare functions. Social Choice and Welfare, 46, pp. 569-608. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-015-0929-9)
Levy, Y. J. (2016) Projections and functions of Nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 45, pp. 435-459. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-015-0517-3)
Gerasimou, G. (2016) Asymmetric dominance, deferral, and status quo bias in a behavioral model of choice. Theory and Decision, 80, pp. 295-312. (doi: 10.1007/s11238-015-9499-7)
Gerasimou, G. (2016) Partially dominant choice. Economic Theory, 61, pp. 127-145. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-015-0869-8)